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ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE CFPB'S
REGULATION OF STUDENT LOAN

COMPANIES
Ian Elijah Calhoun*
Outstanding student loan balances totaled over
$1.38 trillion as of December 31, 2017 with 11% of
student loan debt over ninety days delinquent or in
default. Due to half of all student loans being in
deferment, grace periods, or forbearance, the actual
delinquency rate is likely double the above figure.
Delinquent student borrowers enrolled in some form of
college education expect to improve their financial
position. Instead, many find themselves unable to break
even under the weight of large amounts of debt with
confusing, and often misleading, repayment plans.
Many blame the lending practices of student loan
providers and servicers for the high student loan
default rate. As the primary federal agency charged
with the regulation of consumer financial markets, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") has
used its enforcement powers against student loan
companies that have violated federal consumer
financial law while also developing rules and suggested
practices to make the student loan market less
treacherous for indebted students. The CFPB's
regulatory and supervisory authority over consumer
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financial markets places the agency in a prime position
to address the root causes of the high delinquency rate.
This note will analyze the CFPB's efforts to remedy
the student loan problem by assessing its use of
enforcement powers, its published industry rules and
guidance, and its use of other tools to promote a more
transparentand navigable student loan market. Special
attention is given to consumer relief resulting from
historical enforcement actions, the CFPB's complaint
collection and resolution process, and significant
obstacles to effective regulation of the student loan
market, including insufficient regulatory authority in
the private student loan market, uncertainty concerning
regulators' expectations of student loan companies, and
inconsistent enforcement of consumer financial law.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE STUDENT LOAN PROBLEM
Outstanding student loan balances totaled over $1.38 trillion as
of December 31, 2017. Of that, 11% of student loan debt over ninety
days was delinquent or in default.1 Due to half of all student loans
being in deferment, grace periods, or forbearance, the actual
delinquency rate is likely double the above figure when one only
considers student loans in the repayment cycle. 2 By comparing the
student loan delinquency rate to the rates of auto loans and credit
cards-4.1% and 7.6% respectively-it is clear that students' failure
to remain current on student loan payments is an issue that must
be addressed. 3 These delinquent borrowers enrolled in some form
of college education expecting to improve their financial position.
Instead, they found themselves unable to break even under the
weight of large amounts of debt with confusing, and often
misleading, repayment plans.
Many blame the lending practices of student loan providers and
servicers for the high default rate of student loans. As the primary
federal agency charged with the regulation of consumer financial
markets, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has
used its enforcement powers against student loan companies that
have violated federal consumer financial law while also developing
rules and suggested practices to make the student loan market less
While the continuously
treacherous for indebted students. 4
increasing costs of attending college and some students' unrealistic
expectations of their future earning potential play a role in the
eventual delinquency of many student loans, those issues are
beyond the scope of this Note. However, it should be noted that the
CFPB's educational efforts are attempting to address the

1

See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND

CREDIT: FEBRUARY 2018 (Feb. 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/inter
actives/householdcredit/data/pdflHHDC 2017Q4.pdf (reporting data related to household
debt and credit as of December 31, 2017).
2 Id. at n.2.
3

See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND

CREDIT: FEBRUARY 2018 (Feb. 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/xls/HHD-C-Report_2017Q4.xlsx (click "Page 12" under "National
Charts" heading).
4 See
Enforcement
Actions,
CFPB,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) ("The Bureau may enforce the
law by filing an action in federal district court or by initiating an administrative adjudication
proceeding.").
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expectations of student loan consumers and promote greater
financial understanding among current and former students. The
CFPB's regulatory and supervisory authority over consumer
financial markets places the agency in a prime position to address
the root causes of the high delinquency rate, particularly the unfair
and deceptive practices of some student loan servicers and private
student loan providers.
The agency's enforcement actions may be the best method for
reining in the troubled student loan market in the short term.
However, given the numerous statutes that make up federal
consumer financial law and the various federal agencies with
overlapping authority to enforce those laws, bringing civil suits and
administrative actions against companies and individuals alone is
likely not enough to create a more transparent, accessible, and fair
student loan market. While establishing an agency that would
enforce consumer financial law in a more efficient, streamlined, and
consistent manner was the intent behind the creation of the CFPB,
until a set of specific, uniform rules and guidance is established for
student loan servicers and providers, violations and misleading
practices will continue to occur on a large scale, subjecting student
borrowers to an unfair and deceptive system while facing a crippling
debt load.
This Note will analyze the efficacy of the CFPB's efforts to
remedy the student loan problem by assessing: the agency's use of
enforcement powers against companies facilitating student loans,
published industry rules and guidance, and other tools used by the
agency to promote a more transparent and navigable student loan
market. Part II of this Note will provide background information
on the CFPB, including its role and regulatory authority under the
Consumer Financial Protection Act, and a brief overview of
consumer relief that has resulted from enforcement actions brought
since the agency's inception. Part III.A will focus on the CFPB's
regulatory and supervisory efforts in the student loan market by
assessing enforcement actions against student loan companies,
drawing insights regarding both the criteria that trigger an
enforcement action and the CFPB's methods in pursuit of relief for
consumers. Part III.B will describe the CFPB's complaint collection
and resolution process, using data gained from complaints to
highlight critical issues facing student borrowers. Part JII.C will
describe three obstacles to effective regulation of student loans that
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have resulted in insufficient regulatory authority in the private
student loan market, uncertainty concerning regulators'
expectations of student loan companies, and inconsistent
enforcement of consumer financial law. Part III.C will also provide
potential solutions to these issues and their effect on CFPB
regulation and the student loan market. Part IV will conclude.
II.BACKGROUND
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CFPB

In response to the devastating 2008 financial crisis, the United
States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), the most sweeping
financial reform legislation since the New Deal. 5 Title X of DoddFrank, known as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010
6
(CFPA), established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
The CFPB is a federal agency tasked with implementing and
enforcing federal consumer financial law and ensuring that
consumer financial markets are "fair, transparent, and
competitive." 7 The agency aims to accomplish this through financial
education programs; collection, investigation, and resolution of
consumer complaints; monitoring and researching consumer
financial markets and publishing relevant findings; the supervision
of entities falling under its regulatory authority and enforcement
actions in the event of their noncompliance with federal law; and

5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31,
42 U.S.C.). For a summary of the Act, see PRACTICAL LAW, WESTLAW, SUMMARY OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT: REGULATION OF SYSTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,

Resource I.D. 1-502-8437(2018).
6 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
7 See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)-(c) (2012) (describing the purpose, objectives, and functions of
the CFPB); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491-5494 (2012) (establishing the structure of the CFPB).
It should be noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held the CFPB's
structure unconstitutional in October 2016, primarily because the director of the agency was
subject to removal by the President only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office." PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing 12
U.S.C. § 5441(c)(3)). For an explanation of the case and its potential impact on the CFPB,
see C. Hunter Wiggins & Ethan Levisohn, PHH v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
What it Means for Current and Future CFPB Enforcement, JONES DAY (Oct. 2016),
http://www.jonesday.com/phh-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-what-it-means-forcurrent-and-future-cfpb-enforcement- 10-21-2016.
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the issuance of "rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal
consumer financial law."
The CFPB was intended to consolidate the enforcement of federal
consumer protection law, which is comprised of several statutes
adopted by Congress at various times in response to changes in the
Those statutes have
consumer financial services industry.9
historically been enforced by several different federal agencies, each
with regulatory authority over certain types of entities. 10 For
example, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA), and the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) have a role in the regulation and supervision
of banks and credit unions, while the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has enforced consumer protection statutes against non-banks
operating in a consumer finance capacity or related function. 1 The
divided responsibility for the enforcement of consumer financial
protection statutes, often resulting in multiple agencies regulating
the same entity, created inefficiencies and the potential for
inconsistent interpretation of the law. 12 Congress sought to
ameliorate such issues by creating the CFPB to work in conjunction
with other agencies and granting it regulatory authority over all
"[flederal consumer financial law," which includes the CFPA and
13
eighteen "[e]numerated consumer laws."
Aside from a few specific additions and exceptions provided in
the CFPA, the CFPB's authority extends to any "covered person,"
which includes "any person that engages in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service" and any affiliated person
that "acts as a service provider [or agent] to such person."1 4 The
CFPA also proscribes knowingly or recklessly providing
"substantial assistance" to a "covered person" in violation of certain
8 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(5).

9 See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau Law Enforcement:
An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1065-68 (2016) (describing the establishment of
the CFPB).
10 Id. at 1065.
11 Id. at 1065-66.
12 See id. at 1066 (explaining that the "split responsibility for rulemaking, supervision,
and enforcement across multiple different agencies.., made timely reform and consistent
interpretation difficult").

13 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12), (14) (2012).
14

Id. § 5481(6).
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provisions of the Act, potentially expanding the CFPB's authority to
These
entities that would otherwise be outside its reach. 15
provisions give the agency broad authority to enforce consumer
financial laws against a wide variety of companies and certain
16
individuals acting on their behalf.
B. ENFORCEMENT POWERS

The CFPB has two primary means of enforcing consumer
financial protection law: administrative enforcement procedures
under the agency's regulatory authority and civil litigation in
The agency's administrative enforcement
federal court. 17
procedures typically result in a decision by an administrative law
judge in the CFPB that can be reviewed by the director of the agency
on appeal.1 8 Using either enforcement method, the agency can seek
legal and equitable relief for consumers and punitive civil money
penalties for violations of consumer financial protection law. 19 Both
enforcement methods have been used heavily, with 55% of public
enforcement actions from 2012 to 2015 conducted through
administrative proceedings under the CFPB's Office of
Administrative Adjudication and the other 45% filed in federal
court.

20

Overall, the CFPB's public enforcement actions resulted in over
$11 billion in consumer relief and forgiven debt from the inception
of the agency through the end of 2015, and more than 90% of
15 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(3) (2012). In 2015, the CFPB began using this tool to bring
enforcement actions and issue civil investigative demands with mixed results. For an
explanation and analysis of the CFPB's use of the "substantial assistance" provision, see Ori
Lev & Stephen Lilley, SubstantialAssistance: The CFPB'sNewest Tool, MAYER BROWN (July
19, 2016), https://www.mayer brown.com/substantial-assistance-the-cfpbs-newest-tool-07- 192016/ (follow "Get the full report" hyperlink).
16 See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(25) (defining the CFPB's authority over various individuals,
including directors, officers, agents, and managerial employees of a "covered person"); see also
12 U.S.C. §§ 5517-5518 (2012) (describing the limitations of, and those excluded from, the
CFPB's authority).
17 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563-5564.
18
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1081.103, .104, .402 (2017) (describing the adjudicative hearing and
appeal process within the CFPB's administrative enforcement procedures).
19 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5564-5565 (2012) (defining the CFPB's jurisdiction and available
relief).
20 See Peterson, supra note 9, at 1081 (describing the CFPB's enforcement through civil
litigation and administrative procedures based on an analysis of public enforcement actions
occurring from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015). Note that the percentages cited in
the article are based on a review of publicly announced enforcement actions only.
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consumer relief was due to cases in which defendants were found to
have illegally deceived consumers. 21
In addition to public
enforcement actions, the CFPB, in its supervisory capacity, employs
examiners to investigate and monitor companies that fall under its
authority, resulting in changes to internal policies and procedures
that likely lead to further consumer relief and the prevention of
illegal practices; however, the results of such actions are not
22
publicly released.
C. PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR
PRACTICES

In addition to creating the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also reformed
several existing consumer financial protection laws and built upon
preexisting legal standards.
The CFPA's general statutory
prohibition against unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices
(UDAAP) is one example of this and has played a significant role in
CFPB enforcement actions, including those related to student
loans.23
The CFPA's UDAAP provision, which mirrors the
unfairness and deception standard found in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, applies to all covered persons under the CFPA and
prohibits them from conducting practices that constitute a
UDAAP. 24 The CFPA's UDAAP prohibition goes a step further than
the FTC's standard by introducing an "abusive practices"
component, which prohibits any act or practice that "materially
interferes" with consumers' understanding of a financial product or
service or "takes unreasonable advantage" of consumers' lack of
understanding, inability to protect their interests related to a
financial product or service, or "reasonable reliance" on a covered
25
person to act in their interests.
The language used to define abusive practices is much more
flexible than the unfairness and deception components of the
Id. at 1104.
See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 355-56 (2013) (noting that "[w]hat the CFPB learns during its
examinations is confidential" and that "the information can be used by the CFPB, but it
cannot be shared with private parties").
23 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481, 5531, 5536(a) (2012) (defining UDAAP and giving enforcement
authority to the CFPB upon finding that the UDAAP prohibition was violated).
24 Id. § 5536(1); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (declaring "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce ... unlawful").
25 See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (defining abusive practices).
21
22
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UDAAP provision. To be declared unlawful due to unfairness, the
practice must cause or be "likely to cause substantial injury" that is
"not reasonably avoidable" by consumers. 26 The deceptive practices
standard typically requires that the practice mislead or be likely to
mislead, that the consumer's interpretation is reasonable, and that
the misleading practice is material. 27 These criteria require a more
specific showing of evidence than the vague language defining
abusive practices, giving the CFPB more discretion in finding a
violation. The statutes codifying the CFPA's UDAAP provision are
alleged to have been violated in over 90% of CFPB enforcement
actions. 28 Despite the flexibility the abusive practices standard
adds in the determination of a UDAAP violation, only 11.5% of
public enforcement actions through the end of 2015 alleged abusive
29
practices, with the majority alleging unfair or deceptive practices.
This suggests that the CFPB is aware of the flexibility within its
UDAAP authority and has cautiously utilized the relatively new
"abusive" standard. Further, of the few cases in which abusive
practices were alleged, all were accompanied by an allegation of
unfair or deceptive practices, meeting the more rigorous criteria of
the other standards. 30 The UDAAP provision in the CFPA has been
instrumental in CFPB enforcement actions and is vital to the
deterrence of violations in the student loan market.
III. ANALYSIS: THE CFPB AND STUDENT LOANS
A. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Through the end of 2015, cases involving entities providing,
servicing, or otherwise facilitating new and existing student loans
have constituted only six public CFPB enforcement actions. 3 1 Those
cases resulted in approximately $5 million in consumer relief and
$2.5 million in civil penalties, equivalent to only 4.9% of total
26

See id. § 5531(c) (defining an unlawful unfair practice).

27

See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 9

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210-cfpb-supervision-and(version
2,
2012),
examination-manual-v2.pdf (providing an example of the CFPB's criteria for determining if
a practice is unlawfully deceptive).
28 Id.
at 1095.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 1089 (displaying a table showing all public enforcement actions form 2012

through 2015).
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enforcement actions, 4.5% of consumer relief, and 0.7% of civil
penalties. 32
In 2016 alone, however, three administrative
enforcement actions related to student loans were filed, resulting in
consent orders requiring respondents to pay a combined $23.9
million in consumer relief and $11.7 million in civil penalties. 33 This
signals the agency's increased focus on the regulation of student
loan markets going forward.
Two recent examples of resolved CFPB enforcement actions are
the consent orders settling the administrative filings against Wells
Fargo Bank and Bridgepoint Education. 34 These two cases serve as
fitting examples of the types of violations the CFPB is focusing on
and the consumer redress it seeks in such cases. On August 20,
2016, the CFPB issued a consent order requiring Wells Fargo Bank
pay a $3.6 million penalty and $410,000 in consumer refunds; in
addition, the order required Wells Fargo to improve its consumer
billing and student loan payment processing due to unfair and
deceptive practices that violated the CFPA's UDAAP prohibition
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 35 The bank failed to
provide adequate documentation concerning student loans to
consumers, charged illegal fees, and failed to correct inaccurate
information submitted to credit reporting companies after becoming
aware of the errors. 36 These violations caused student borrowers to
receive misinformation about their loans, pay unnecessary and
illegal late fees, and deal with the far-reaching consequences of a
37
wrongfully decreased credit score.
The CFPB's consent order against Bridgepoint Education, Inc., a
for-profit college, was issued on September 8, 2016, resulting in
approximately $5 million in consumer relief and an $8 million civil

32

See id. (categorizing all public enforcement actions by financial product or service).

33 See generally Student Aid Institute, Inc., Steven Lamont, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0008

(Mar. 30, 2016), http://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpbconsent-order-student-aidinstitute-inc-steven-lamont.pdf; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug.
22, 2016), http://s3.amazon aws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2016-CFPB0013WellsFargoBankN.A.---Consent- Order.pdf; Bridgepoint Education, Inc., CFPB No.
2016-CFPB-0016 (Sept. 8, 2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/documents/092016_cfpb_ BridgepointConsentOrder.pdf.
34 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2016-CFPB-0013; Bridgepoint Education, Inc., No. 2016CFPB-0016.
35 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013, at 1, 18-26.
36 Id. at 14-17.
37

Id.
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penalty.3 8 Bridgepoint was found to have committed deceptive acts
and practices regarding the amounts of monthly payments due
under the company's institutional loan program.3 9 Students were
induced to take out private student loans with the company via
advertisements showing a monthly payment amount that was lower
than what students would be required to pay, violating the CFPA's
40
UDAAP provision.
Two significant insights can be gleaned from these cases. First,
the Wells Fargo case illustrates the CFPB's focus on companies that
negatively impact a large number of consumers even when the bulk
of violations committed are minor customer service issues. Second,
the enforcement action against Bridgepoint illustrates another
situation that draws the attention of CFPB officials, a deceptive
practice that, although affecting a relatively small percentage of
consumers, was so egregious that the damages assessed were much
more severe. These two enforcement actions demonstrate the
CFPB's focus on bringing widespread unfair practices to a halt
while still targeting more reprehensible violations, even if those
practices are taking place on a much smaller scale.
B. CONSUMER COMPLAINTS

As demonstrated by the two cases discussed above, the CFPB's
enforcement actions based on UDAAP violations are very effective
in obtaining consumer relief accompanied with large civil penalties.
The UDAAP statutes are the regulatory vehicle best-suited for
quickly addressing the most common complaints among student
loan consumers. In the 2016 Student Loan Ombudsman's Midyear
Report, the processing of income-driven repayment plans (IDRs)
was identified as a primary issue plaguing student loan borrowers,
a finding based on approximately 3,500 private student loan
complaints, 2,400 federal loan complaints, and 1,500 student debt
collection complaints received by the CFPB from October 1, 2015 to
May 31, 2016.41

38

Bridgeport Education, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0016, at 9, 12.

39 Bridgepoint Education, Inc., No. 2016-CFPB-0016, at 6.
40

Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B) (2012)).

41

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MIDYEAR UPDATE ON STUDENT LOAN COMPLAINTS 2, 13

(2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201608_cfpbOmbudsmanMidYearReport.pdf.
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Complaints concerning IDR plans included unreasonable delays
in processing applications, inconsistent or inaccurate processing,
and difficulty in successfully recertifying financial information,
which is typically an annual requirement to remain in an IDR
plan.42 These burdensome loan servicing practices often result in
increased costs and unaffordable payments for consumers that were
unable to obtain approval for an IDR plan before higher payments
were due. 43 Given the UDAAP standards and enforcement actions
described above, many of these complaints, if accurate, are likely
Unexpected jumps in required
describing UDAAP violations.
payments likely meet the unfairness standard by being likely to
cause an unavoidable injury to young borrowers with limited
budgets, and the loan servicing practices would certainly meet at
least one of the requirements needed for the abusiveness
standard. 44 Since the CFPB can identify the loan practices causing
the most complaints and tie the bulk of complaints back to a handful
of student loan servicers like Navient, Transworld Systems Inc.,
and AES/PHEAA, the CFPB's complaint collection and resolution
system constitutes a key indicator of potential enforcement
actions. 45 It also identifies the specific practices that future
regulations and guidance should address to make the greatest
impact. 46 Both enforcement actions and the issuance of new rules
and guidance for the student loan market, which are advocated in
more detail below, are necessary for a significant change in student
loan practices.
C. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION

While enforcement actions have been an unequivocal success on
a case-by-case basis, the overall market-wide effect is yet to be seen.
The number of student borrowers in default or over ninety days
delinquent increased every year from 2011 to 2015.47 Since then, the
42

Id. at 2.

43 Id.
44 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (explaining the CFPB's prohibition

against unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and its applicable legal standards).
45 See MIDYEAR UPDATE, supra note 41, at 8,10 (displaying complaint data categorized by
the type of complaint, type of loan, and private loan company or student loan servicer in
"Table 1," "Figure 2," and "Table 2").
46

Id.

47

FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. CONSUMER CREDIT PANEL, 2016 STUDENT LOAN UPDATE

(2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html

(click to expand "Balances"
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number of delinquent student loans has hovered around 11%
through the end of 2017;48 Enforcement actions alone cannot
significantly shift practices in the market. Three primary obstacles
to the effectiveness of the CFPB's regulatory efforts are: (1) the
limited reach of the CFPB's authority, particularly regarding small
private loan servicers, (2) the lack of defined practices that
constitute UDAAPs, and (3) inconsistent regulation by the CFPB
and the Department of Education (DOE), leaving students facing
varying levels of service and compliance with federal law and
leading to uncertainty concerning regulators' expectations of
student loan companies.
1. Limited Reach of the CFPB'sAuthority. The CFPB's authority
over nonbank student loan servicers stems from the "largerparticipant" rule, which brings large companies in consumer
financial markets under the agency's supervisory authority. 49 The
CFPB determined that the rule applies to any student loan servicer
and its affiliates if it services over one million accounts. 50 This
criterion is likely only met by the seven largest student loan
servicers. These seven are responsible for an estimated 75 million
accounts, comprised of 30 million federal loans and 45 million
private loans. 5 1 That leaves an estimated 7%-29% of the nonbank
52
student loan servicing market outside the CFPB's authority.
Supervising and pursuing enforcement actions against the seven
largest student loan servicers is likely to have an impact on
servicing practices market-wide, and enforcement actions against
those companies are likely to yield the greatest relief to the greatest
number of consumers. However, potentially leaving 29% of the
nonbank student loan servicer market without regulatory oversight
is problematic and constitutes a significant obstacle to a uniform
improvement in student loan practices.

under "Student Debt" heading; then click "2016 Student Loan Data Update"; finally, click
"Number of Borrowers by Repayment Status").
48 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 3.
49 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(1) (2014).
5o 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106(b) (2014).
51 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg.
73,395 n.75 (Dec. 6, 2013).
52 Id. at 73,396.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/6

14

Calhoun: Assessing the Efficacy of the CFPB's Regulation of Student Loan C

2018] REGULATION OF STUDENT LOAN COMPANIES

927

2. Failure to Define UDAAPs. Thus far, the only regulation the
CFPB has issued concerning the student loan servicing market
defined what constitutes a larger participant in the market, which
53
subjected all entities meeting the definition to CFPB authority.
No regulations have been issued regarding the CFPB's expectations
of student loan company practices.5 4 Many in the wider financial
services industry have criticized the CFPB for not issuing new rules
to clarify its expectations, particularly concerning the definition of
UDAAPs, while deeming the agency's approach thus far "regulation
by enforcement." 55 Richard Cordray, former Director of the CFPB,
rejected this idea and stated that "explicitly articulat[ing] rules for
every eventuality" would lead to paralysis. 56 Student Loan Servicing
is listed on the Agency Rule List as a "Long-Term Action" in the
regulatory agenda published by the CFPB in Fall 2016, but any final
57
rule will likely not include an enumerated list of defined UDAAPs.
However, establishing rules that define UDAAPs would
eliminate a significant amount of uncertainty in the market
surrounding the CFPB's expectations and enforcement actions, in
addition to other benefits.5 8 Under the CFPA, the CFPB can
prescribe rules that identify UDAAPs "in connection with a
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or
service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service"
59
and establish requirements for preventing those practices.
53 12 C.F.R. § 1090.106 (2014). For a description of final rules, rules under development,
and
the
CFPB's
regulatory
agenda,
see
Rulemaking,
CFPB,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
54 See
Final
Rules,
CFPB,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/rulemaking/final-rules/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (generating a list of final rules
promulgated by the CFPB, none of which describe unlawful student loan company practices).
55 Alan S. Kaplinsky, Director Cordray Acknowledges Industry-Wide Application of
Consent
Orders,
CONSUMER
FIN.
MONITOR
(Mar.
10,
2016),
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2016/03/10/director-cordray-acknowledges-industry-wideapplication-of-consent-order/.
56

Id.

57 AGENCY RULE LIST - FALL 2016: CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, OFF.

INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION-

GETAGEN
CYRULELIST&currentPubld=201604&showStage=longterm&agencyCd=
3170&Image58.x=51&Image58.y=11&Image58=Submit (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
58 See William J. Cox, The Student Borrower: Slave to the Servicer?, 27 LOy. CONSUMER L.
REV. 189, 232 (2015) (arguing that "[d]efined-UDAAP regulations provide three benefits: (1)
easier adjudication of UDAAP violations; (2) upfront notice to service as to what constitutes
a UDAAP; and (3) a second line of defense for students in the form of SAG enforcement of
these rules").
59 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (2012).
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Utilizing this provision would allow states to enforce violations
under their own authority, streamline adjudication of enforcement
actions, and provide student loan companies notice of what acts
60
constitute a UDAAP.
Dodd-Frank enables state attorneys general to enforce
regulations promulgated under the CFPA's UDAAP provision, but
they cannot enforce the UDAAP prohibition itself.61 Therefore,
without regulations defining UDAAPs, states cannot enforce the
62
law despite the statute's clear intent to empower them to do so.
Many states have similar prohibitions of deceptive and unfair
practices; 63 however, these provisions vary from state to state and
likely only allow for enforcement against private student lenders
and loan servicers since state enforcement actions against federal
student loan servicers may be preempted by the Higher Education
Act of 1965.64 Further, in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, the
Supreme Court held that it is illegal for a state to use its
investigative authority under these provisions if it does not intend
to bring a claim, effectively eliminating states' ability to supervise
student loan companies under a state prohibition against deceptive
and unfair practices. 65 Thus, state prohibitions of unfair and
deceptive practices are not sufficient to enable state attorneys
general to properly regulate student loan servicers. If the CFPB
Cox, supra note 58, at 232.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(2)(B) (2012) (giving state attorneys general the authority to
enforce regulations prescribed under the CFPA); see also Cox, supra note 58, at 220 (citing
12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(2)(B) (2012) and Gail Hillebrand, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Address at the Dodd-Frank Symposium (Mar. 11, 2011), in 8 BERKELEY Bus. L.J., 2011, at
219, 223) (noting that state attorneys general cannot enforce the statutory UDAAP provision
itself, only rules promulgated under it).
62 See Cox, supra note 58, at 232 (noting that "[i]f the CFPB does not define what
constitutes a UDAAP, at least nine states and the District of Columbia will be unable to
protect students from servicer abuses").
63 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (2017); O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 2507A (2017).
64 See 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (2012) (exempting federal student loans from state disclosure
requirements). For an example of this type of preemption, see Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d
936, 942-43, 950 (9th Cir. 2010), where the court held that the Higher Education Act's
exemption effectively barred any state claims concerning deceptive business practices
because they would be "the converse" of a state requiring alternate disclosures. Courts are
divided on this issue; however, the fact that many jurisdictions do consider state enforcement
actions against federal loan servicers preempted is sufficient to demonstrate the need for
another vehicle for enforcement. For an in-depth explanation of the exemption's effect, see
Cox, supra note 58, at 215-17.
65 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009).
60
61
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were to establish regulations defining UDAAPs, states would be
able to supplement the CFPB's efforts in preventing illegal
practices, further deterring violations.
Additionally, regulations defining UDAAPs would streamline the
adjudication process because the CFPB would only have to prove
that one of the defined UDAAPs occurred to justify an enforcement
action instead of being required to prove that a certain act is unfair,
66
deceptive, or abusive based on its investigation in each case.
Lastly, the proposed regulations would provide regulated entities
notice of what constitutes a UDAAP, reducing uncertainty in the
market and making it easier for companies to ensure they are
67
complying with the law.
3. Inconsistent Application of Regulatory Authority by the CFPB
and the Department of Education. Another source of inefficiency
and confusion concerning regulators' expectations of student loan
services is the difference in supervision and enforcement of federal
student loan servicers by the CFPB and the Department of
Education (DOE). The DOE's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA)
supervises federal student loan servicers through compliance and
performance standards in its loan servicing contracts, while the
CFPB has regulatory authority over only those federal servicers
that fall under the "larger participants" designation. 6 8 The DOE
typically declines to publicly admonish its loan servicers and
occasionally defends them from criticism from other federal
agencies. 69 In contrast, the CFPB treats federal student loan
servicers with the same scrutiny as private student loan companies,
threatening legal action for violations of any federal consumer
financial law.7 0 This arrangement potentially leads to uncertainty
for federal student loan servicers given the flexibility of CFPB
enforcement and the lack of defined parameters for what constitutes
a UDAAP.
While a federal student loan servicer in compliance with the
FSA's standards in its loan servicing contract is unlikely to be
66 Cox, supra note 58, at 232.
67 Id.
68 Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg.
73,383, 73,398-99 (Dec. 6, 2013).
69 "The Government Can't Agree With Itself On Policing Student Loan Companies
Banking Report," 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 08, at 279 (Aug. 29, 2016).
70

Id.
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subject to a CFPB enforcement action, the CFPB notes that it
expects increased compliance of federal student loan servicers with
consumer financial protection laws due to its regulatory
supervision, albeit to a lesser extent than that expected of private
student loan servicers. 71 Though joint efforts between the CFPB
and the DOE, such as the Joint Statement of Principles on Student
Loan Servicing released in September 2015 and the Policy Direction
on Federal Student Loan Servicing memorandum in July 2016,
suggest that the two governmental entities are attempting to
address the market in a unified manner, any inconsistent
application of their respective regulatory authorities creates
72
inefficiencies and uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rising number of delinquent student borrowers and the
abysmal default rate of student loans call for consistent, efficient
regulation of student loan companies. The CFPB's enforcement
actions to date have successfully obtained millions of dollars in
relief and civil penalties for consumers, which is a significant step
in the right direction. However, uncertainty among student loan
services due to a lack of regulations defining UDAAPs and
inconsistent supervision among regulatory authorities is limiting
the law's impact on the student loan market. The CFPB should
issue regulations specifically defining UDAAPs in addition to
continuing to issue guidance concerning industry practices and
ensuring that consumer financial protection laws are enforced
consistently by itself and the DOE. These actions will eliminate
much of the uncertainty in the student loan market, facilitate

71
72

78 Fed. Reg. at 73,399 (Dec. 6, 2013).
See Brian Slagle, CFPB, DOE, Treasury Issue Joint Statement on Student Loan

Servicing,

CONSUMER

FIN.

MONITOR

(Oct.

5,

2015),

https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/05/cfpb-doe-treasury-issue-joint-statement-onstudent-loan-servicing/ (providing a general overview of the document and noting that one of
the Joint Statement's four broad target areas is the lack of clear expectations and minimum
requirements for student loan servicers); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUCATION DEPARTMENT TO
IMPLEMENT IMPROVED CUSTOMER SERVICE AND ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENT LOAN

(2016),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/education-departmentBORROWERS
implement-improved-customer-service-and-enhanced-protections-student-loan-brrwers
(announcing and summarizing the memorandum from U.S. Under Secretary of Education
Ted Mitchell).
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increased industry compliance, and protect student borrowers from
harmful practices.
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